UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-4-2015

Hymas v. Meridian Police Dept. Appellant's Brief
Dckt. 42626

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Hymas v. Meridian Police Dept. Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42626" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5473.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5473

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GRETCHEN HYMAS, BREANNA
HALOWELL and TRAVIS FORBUSH,
P eti ti oners-Appellants,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court
Docket No. 42626-2014

)
Ada County
) Docket No. CV OC 2012-23460
)
THE MERIDIAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
)
)
Respondent.
)
)

vs.

APPELLANTS'BRIEF
Second Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District County of Ada
The Honorable Melissa Moody
District Judge Presiding

Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
For Appellants

William L. M. Nary
Emily Kane
City of Meridian
Office of the City Attorney
33 E. Broadway Ave.
Meridian, ID 83642
For Respondent

FILED· COPY
MAY O4 2015
Entered on ATS by

Table of Contents

Statement of the Case .............................................................................. 1
The Course of the Proceedings in the Hearing Below and its Disposition ............ .1
Statement of the Facts .........................................................................3
Issues Presented on Appeal. ................................................................. 7
1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it ruled the burden to
show the MDP's conduct was frivolous shifted to the Petitioners at the Show
Cause Hearing?
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it ruled the MPD had
established any of its investigation file was exempt from disclosure.
3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it ruled because the
MPD's investigation was ongoing the MPD's refusal to release any
documents in response to a valid Public Record's Request was not frivolous?
4. Whether the Appellants are entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT .............................................................. ?
STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................. 7
STANDARD FOR A WARDING ATTORNEY FEES IN A PUBLIC RECORDS ..8
REQUEST ACTION
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION FOLLOWING REMAND .................. 8
THE DATE OF THE MPD'S DENIAL WAS THE RELEVANT DATE FOR ..... .10
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ANALYSIS
THE MPD FILE CONTAINED "PUBLIC RECORDS" ................................ .11
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED ....... .12
THE BURDEN SHIFTED TO THE PETITIONERS TO PROVE THE MPD
HAD NOT ACTED FRIVOLOUSLY
l

THE MPD FAILED TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE PROBABILITY ......... 15
THAT HARM CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 9-335(l)(A)-(F) WOULD
RESULT FROM DISCLOSURE OF ANY RECORDS IN THE MPD FILE
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED ........ 18
THE MPD HAD NOT ACTED FRIVOLOUSLY
1. THE MPD 'S DENIAL OF THE APPELLANTS' PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST .... 19
WAS FRIVOLOUS WHEN THE DENIAL WAS BASED ON THE MPD's
INSTITUTIONALIZED DISREGARD FOR THE LAW
2. THE MPD HAD ALREADY RELEASED THE REQUESTED INFORMATION ....... 20
THE APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL ..... 21
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................. 23

11

Table of Cases and Authorities
Idaho Cases:

Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation District, 154 Idaho 317, .......... 7
297 P.3d 1134 (2013)
Hymas v. Meridian Police Dep't, _ _ Idaho _ _, ................... 9
330 P.3d 1097 (Ct. App., 2014)
Wade v. Taylor,

Idaho_, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014) ............... 11, 12, 15, 21

Idaho Statutes:

LC.§ 9-335(l)(a)-(f) ....................................................... 15, 18, 19
I.C. § 9-344 .......................... ....................................... .8, 21

lll

Statement of the Case
This is the second appeal of a case involving the wrongful and absolute
denial by the Meridian Police Department of a valid public records request.

The Course of the Proceedings in the Hearing Below and its Disposition
The Petitioners-Appellants include the parents and girlfriend of Marine
Private First Class McQuen Forbush who died on November 10, 2012 of carbon
monoxide poisoning while on leave and visiting Idaho.
On December 6, 2012, Appellants' counsel sent a public records request to
the Meridian Police Department ("MPD"). (R. 1 p. 8.)
On December 21, 2012, the MPD denied Appellants' public records request
and refused to provide a single document or any information from its investigation.

(R. p. 9.)
On December 26, 2012 the Appellants filed a Verified Petition to Compel
Disclosure of Public Records. (R. pp. 4-10.)
On February 12, 2013, Judge Moody entered an Order to Show Cause
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-344, and set the show cause hearing for February 27,
2013. (R. pp. 19-21.)
On February 25, 2013, counsel for the MPD mailed a copy of the redacted
file to the Petitioner's counsel.

1 "R" as used in this Brief means or refers to the Clerk's Record in the First Appeal, Doc. No. 41156,
which is augmented into the Clerk's Record in this case according the Supreme Court Order Augmenting
Appeal, dated October 27, 2014. For clarification, "R. 2nd appeal" means or refers to the short Clerk's
Record in the second appeal. Finally, "SR" means or refers to the supplemental Clerk's Record filed in
this case in March 2015, which includes the MPD file segregated into exhibits by Judge Moody.
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On February 27, 2013, Judge Moody conducted the show cause hearing.
On March 15, 2013, the District Court issued its Order Denying Motion for
Attorney's fees and Costs. (R. pp. 347-381.)
The Appellants then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was heard on
April 29, 2013. (Apr. 29, 2013, hearing Tr. p. 1 top. 28.)
On May 14, 2013, the Court then issued an Order Denying Petitioners'

Motion/or Reconsideration. 2
While the first Appeal was pending, the Appellants augmented the appellate
record with the Court's Order Clarifying Record on Appeal, which was file
stamped October 29, 2013. 3
The Appellants also sought and obtained an Order directing the creation of a
transcript of the post-judgment hearing conducted on October 28, 2013. 4
The Court of Appeals filed its decision on July 25, 2014; reversing the
District Court and remanding the case for further proceedings.
After the Court of Appeal's decision, the District Court sent an e-mail to
counsel arguing that the Court of Appeals erred and suggesting the MPD appeal
the ruling. (R. 2nd Appeal, p. 20.)
The District Court also stated in its opinion that the Appellants had not fully
disclosed the record and that was the basis for the Court of Appeals' apparently

This Order is in the Clerk's Record on Appeal according to Supreme Court Order Granting Appellants'
Second Motion to Augment the Record, entered December 16, 2013.
3 This Order is in the Clerk's Record on Appeal according to Supreme Court Order Granting Appellants'
Motion to Augment the Record, entered December 3, 2013.
4 The Transcript of the District Court hearing conducted October 29, 2013 was generated and made part
of the record on appeal according to Supreme Court Order Granting Motion for Additional Transcript,
entered November 13, 2013.
2
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erroneous decision. (R. 2 nd Appeal, p. 7-9.)
Following remand, the District Court segregated a copy of the MPD file,
presented by the MPD at the Show Cause hearing, into the District Court's
exhibits. The District Court identified these exhibits in the Supplement Clerk's
Record on pages 9-20. 5 The District Court's exhibits are identified and included in
the Supplemental Clerk's Record as pages 21-363.
On August 20, 2014, the District Court entered an Order Denying Petitioner
Attorney's Fees and Costs. (R. 2nd Appeal, p. 7.) The District Court appropriately
found the Petitioners were the prevailing party. "Petitioner is the prevailing party
because Petitioner ultimately received all of the records requested." (R. 2nd Appeal,
p. 10.) However, the District Court again refused to award attorney fees.
The District Court did not conduct any additional evidentiary hearings post
remand.
Statement of the Facts
The Appellants hereby cite to the Statement of Facts section of their
Appellants' Brief filed in their first appeal and incorporate those facts as stated
herein.
The Appellants also add the following facts that are relevant to the issues
presented in the current appeal.
The Ada County Coroner conducted an autopsy on McQuen Forbush's body
on November 12, 2012, (SR. p. 61.), and issued a Press Release on November 13,
2012. (SR. p. 172.) As ofNovember 13, 2012 the Coroner reported McQuen's

5

The District Court specified and identified the contents of the MPD file as it existed on various dates.
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"cause of death" as "Acute Carbon Monoxide Poisoning," and stated the "manner
of death," was an "Accident."
MPD Detective James Miller was the lead detective on the case. Below are
relevant excerpts from Detective Miller's police report.
11-14-12

***
At about 1230 hrs, I received a voice mail message from Jack Garret
that he left at 1205 hrs. Garret is an investigator with State Farm,
and asked me to call him, 631-3052.

I called Jack Garrett and we agreed to meet at the apartment at
about 1400 hrs.

***

At about 1400 hrs, Lt. Mike De St. Germain and I met Jack Garrett at
apartment 4624. Jerry Peterson arrived a short time later. Peterson
and Garrett re-examined the water heater and performed more
tests. I took photos of the information on the heater panel, and
model and serial information from the water heater.
(SR. pp. 63-64.) (EII1phasis added.)
11/15/12 0800 hours: Sage Crest Apartment Building 46, Unit 24
On this date I returned to the apartment along with Mr. Peterson and
Jack Garret of Jack Garrett Investigations. Garrett was representing
the insurance company, Farm Bureau, on behalf of the
maintenance company for the apartment complex, First Rate.
Garrett's phone number is 208-344-8179.
11/16/12 0800 hours: Sage Crest Apartment Building 46, Unit 24
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Mr. Peterson, Mr. Garrett and I returned for a final series of
testing. Upon conclusion of each set of testing the furnace/hot water
heater was turned off.

(SR. p. 39.) (Emphasis added.)
12-5-12

At about 0844 hrs, I received a call from Jack Garrett. Garrett asked
me ifhe could obtain a copy of Jerry Peterson's report. Garrett said
Jerry Peterson told him he wouldn't provide him a copy without my
approval. I told Garrett I would send Peterson an e-mail stating he
could provide him a copy of his report.
During my conversation with Jake (sic) Garrett I told him I found
a business that could test the thermostat. Garrett told me he didn't
think the thermostat was the problem and said a switch on the blower
wasn't turning off when the thermostat was telling it to. I had not yet
heard this and I began recording our conversation and asked Garrett
more about this. Garrett explained when the thermostat calls for heat it
activates a valve or a switch that turns the blower on and when the
blower comes on the water circulates and the pump comes on. Garrett
explained when the thermostat said it was hot enough and to shut off,
the blower wasn't shutting off. Garrett said even with the thermostat
not in place the blower would come on if the manual switch was on.

I asked Jake (sic) Garrett if this was occurring at the unit where the
fan blower is or was it the water heater. Garrett told me it was not the
water heater; it's the fan and blower system in the heat exchanger. I
asked if the heat exchanger was overriding what the thermostat was
telling it to do. Garrett mentioned a statement where a lady said
she couldn't get the heater to stop without turning the switch off. I
agreed with Garrett remembering what Adra Kipper had told me.
I told Garrett I was still going to send the thermostat in to be looked at
and he agreed it would be a good idea.
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(SR. pp. 65-66.) (Emphasis added.)
Jerry Peterson, referenced in Det. Millers report, is the HVAC / Residential
Energy Program Manager for the Idaho Division of Building Safety. Jack Garrett
asked Jerry Peterson for a copy of the report of Mr. Peterson's investigation of the
source and cause of the carbon monoxide, and Mr. Peterson sent the request to Det.
Miller for approval of its release. (SR. pp. 87-92.) Mr. Peterson's report, which
Det. Miller released to Mr. Garrett on December 6, 2012, was included in the
MPD's file for the District Court's review. (SR. pp. 88-92.)
Appellants' Counsel documented contacts between the Meridian City
Attorney and Counsel in the latter part of December 2012 in an Affidavit filed in
Support of Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider. (R. p. 384-402.) The Meridian City
Attorney contacted Petitioner's Counsel and requested that Counsel dismiss the
case. Petitioner's Counsel communicated to the Meridian City Attorney that
Counsel could not understand why the MPD would not release any information at
all. Counsel argued that releasing the make, model and serial number of the water
heater could hardly interfere with the investigation. The Meridian City Attorney
agreed, but conditioned the release of this information on the Petitioners'
dismissing their case. The Petitioners' counsel denied any agreement to dismiss
the case and asserted the MPD was obligated to provide the requested information.
Ultimately the Meridian City Attorney confirmed that disclosure of the make,
model and serial number of the water heater would not interfere with the MPD's
investigation. "The disclosure of this specifically requested information, although
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it is a part of an investigatory record of the Meridian Police Department, is deemed
not to interfere with enforcement proceedings." (R. p. 393.)

Issues Presented on Appeal
1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it ruled the burden to
show the MDP's conduct was frivolous shifted to the Petitioners at the Show
Cause Hearing?
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it ruled the MPD had
established any of its investigation file was exempt from disclosure.
3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it ruled because the
MPD's investigation was ongoing the MPD's refusal to release any documents
in response to a valid Public Record's Request was not frivolous?
4. Whether the Appellants are entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, this Court
employs a three-part inquiry to determine: "(1) whether the court perceived the
issue as discretionary; (2) whether the court acted within the bounds of that
discretion and applied the correct legal standards; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision through an exercise of reason." Bettwieser v. New York

Irrigation District, 154 Idaho 317,297 P.3d 1134 (2013), quoting Am. Pension
Servs., Inc. v. Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC, 147 Idaho 638,641,213 P.3d
1038, 1041 (2009) (citingHaywardv. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342,
345, 33 P.3d 816, 819 (2001)).
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STANDARD FOR AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES IN A PUBLIC
RECORDS REQUEST ACTION
By statute, a Court has discretion to award attorney fees when requested by a
party seeking disclosure of public records.
(2) If the court finds that the public official's decision to refuse
disclosure is not justified, it shall order the public official to make
the requested disclosure. If the court determines that the public
official was justified in refusing to make the requested record
available, he shall return the item to the public official without
disclosing its content and shall enter an order supporting the decision
refusing disclosure. In any such action, the court shall award
reasonable costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party or parties, if
it finds that the request or refusal to provide records was frivolously
pursued.
LC. § 9-344. ORDER OF THE COURT -- COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION FOLLOWING REMAND
In the Court of Appeals' Opinion, the Court gave clear directions to the
District Court upon remand.
Here, the district court did not engage in this analysis due to its
erroneous determination that the MPD's initial refusal to disclose the
requested investigatory records was justified under a categorical
exemption. As such, this case must be remanded to allow the district
court the opportunity to review the requested investigatory records
and determine, under the proper statutory standard enunciated in
Wade, whether the MPD was justified in its initial refusal to disclose
the requested records. If the district court finds that the MPD was not
so justified, the district court must then determine whether there was a
prevailing party in the case and whether the refusal was so unjustified
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as to be frivolous, thereby requiring an award of attorney fees and
costs.

Hymas v. Meridian Police Dep't, __ Idaho __, 330 P.3d 1097, 1105 (Ct. App.,
2014)
Upon remand, the District Court reviewed the MPD file, segregated that file
into exhibits and identified which exhibits existed as various times. The District
Court then issued its decision titled, Order Denying Petitioner Attorney's Fees and

Costs.
The District Court began its Order Denying Petitioner Attorney's Fees And

Costs by suggesting the Court of Appeal's decision was suspect because the Court
of Appeals did not have the complete record. Contrary to the District Court's
conclusion, Appellants presented all relevant documents in the District Court file
on appeal.
The District Court then stated three bases for its refusal to award attorney
fees to the Petitioners. First, the District Court found the Petitioners failed to
identify documents they believed were withheld wrongfully. " ... Petitioner failed
to specifically identify for the District Court the records that Petitioner believes
were frivolously withheld. Therefore, Petitioner has not demonstrated that any
records were withheld frivolously, as would be necessary for it to be entitled to
attorney's fees and costs." (R. 2 nd Appeal, p. 10.) Second, the District Court found
that the Petitioners had not demonstrated that withholding the entire file was
frivolous.
To the extent that Petitioner may claim that Petitioner identified all of
the records as being frivolously withheld, thus necessitating the
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district court's review of every single document, this position is itself
frivolous. A party that has received all of the public records the party
requested should not be permitted to send the district court on a
fishing expedition with the blanket assertion that all of the documents
were frivolously withheld. (Unless, of course, all of the documents
were frivolously withheld, as demonstrated by the moving party's
well-reasoned and good-faith argument to that effect. No such
argument was presented by Petitioner here.)
Third, the District Court then found the MPD did not act frivolously, even if
the documents and information should have been produced. "Regardless, as an

alternative holding, Petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs because
the investigative exemption was asserted non-frivolously with respect to all of the
documents requested by Petitioner on December 6, 2012." (R. 2 nd Appeal, p. 11.)
(Emphasis in original)
The Appellants now appeal because, respectfully, none of the District Court's
rulings comply with the Wade decision or public records law. Notwithstanding the
District Court's ruling, the facts establish there was no basis to rule that any
exemption to disclosure applied. Additionally, the MPD acted frivolously in
refusing to disclose records and information in its file when it was unlikely a crime
had even been committed and because the MPD had already released information to
the public as of the date of the denial of the Petitioners' request.
THE DATE OF THE MPD'S DENIAL WAS THE RELEVANT DATE FOR
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ANALYSIS
In its Order Denying Petitioner Attorney's Fees and Costs the Court stated,
"As of December 6, 2012, the date of the public records request, Meridian Police
Department had 26 exhibits, including photos, in its investigative file. As to none
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of those 26 exhibits was the investigative exemption asserted frivolously." (R. 2nd
Appeal, p. 11.) To be accurate, the District Court divided the MPD file into
"exhibits" following the remand from the Court of Appeals. The MPD presented
its entire file prior to the Show Cause hearing, but did not submit any portion of
that file as separate exhibits. The exhibits presented on appeal as pages 21-363 of
the Supplemental Clerk's Record were generated by the District Court, not the
MPD.
The District Court discussed the file as it existed on the date of the request
denial on December 21, 2012, which is the relevant date according to Wade v.

Taylor,_ Idaho_, 320 P.3d 1250 (2014). Accordingly, the District Court's
analysis in its Order Denying Petitioner Attorney's Fees and Cost of the contents
of the MPD file as it existed on December 6, 2012, or on the date the file was
ultimately disclosed in February 2013, is irrelevant. The only pertinent date is the
date of the denial of the public records request. Wade v. Taylor, 320 P.3d at 1259.
The District Court ultimately ruled, "As of December 21, 2012, the date of
the denial of the public records request, Meridian Police Department had 60
exhibits, including photos, in its investigative file. As to none of those 60 exhibits
was the investigative exemption asserted frivolously." (R. 2nd Appeal, p. 12.)
The Appellants respectfully argue the District Court abused its discretion in so
ruling.
THE MPD FILE CONTAINED "PUBLIC RECORDS"
Because this Court presumes that "all public records are open unless
expressly provided otherwise by statute," this Court narrowly
construes exceptions to the duty of public disclosure. Federated
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Publ'ns, Inc. v. Boise City, 128 Idaho 459,463, 915 P.2d 21, 25
(1996). Thus, this Court's first inquiry is whether the writings
requested are public records; if so, this Court presumes the records to
be open to the public, unless it is shown that an exemption applies.
See Cowles Publ'g Co. v. Kootenai Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 144
Idaho 259, 262, 159 P.3d 896, 899 (2007).
Wade v. Taylor,_ Idaho_, 320 P.3d 1250, 1256 (2014).
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED
THE BURDEN SHIFTED TO THE PETITIONERS TO PROVE THE MPD
HAD NOT ACTED FRIVOLOUSLY

In Wade, the Supreme Court determined that the timeframe at issue is the
date of the denial of the public records request. "Finally, we note that the inquiry
should focus on whether the withholding agency has shown a reasonable
probability of a harm identified in Idaho Code section 9-335(1 )(a)-(f) at the time
of the denial of the public records request rather than at the time of the hearing."

Wade v. Taylor,_ Idaho_, 320 P.3d 1250, 1259 (2014). Accordingly, even if
the responding party produced the requested documents prior to the Show Cause
hearing, no burden shifts to the requesting party. The burden remains on the
responding party to establish the nondisclosure was based on a valid exemption, or
in the alternative if not based on a valid exemption, then the responding party did
not act frivolously. Any decision to the contrary is an abuse of the District Court's
discretion.
In its Opinion, the District Court stated it did not review the records because
it believed the Petitioners had the burden to identify the documents the Petitioners'
believed had been wrongfully withheld.
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Thus, the reason the Court did not review the records was not, as
might have been suggested on appeal, that no review was necessary
because the investigative exception applied. Instead, it was that
Petitioner, having obtained voluntary production of the records
(without need for the Court to review them and determine which of
them must be produced), should have told the Court which documents
it perceived to have been frivolously withheld.
nd

(R. 2 Appeal, p. 9.)

That is not how the District Court conducted the hearing, however.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

THE COURT: All right. So, in that, taking
that approach, Ms. Kane or Mr. Nary, either of you
who wants to call witnesses or present argument, I
think that you have the burden of proof to show
that that was an appropriate exemption.
MS. KANE: Your Honor, we'd agree with that.

(February 27, Order to Show Cause Hearing, Tr. p. 14, LL 15-20.)
At the Show Cause hearing, the District Court acknowledged the MPD's
duty when it stated it was the MPD's burden to go forward and prove a valid
exemption.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

THE COURT: All right. So, in that, taking
that approach, Ms. Kane or Mr. Nary, either of you
who wants to call witnesses or present argument, I
think that you have the burden of proof to show
that that was an appropriate exemption.
MS. KANE: Your Honor, we'd agree with that.

(February 27, OSC Hearing, Tr. p. 14, LL 15-20.) (Emphasis Added.)
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However, and despite now having the benefit of the Wade opinion, the
District Court based its denial following remand of Petitioners' request for attorney
fees by shifting the burden to the Petitioners to show the MPD had acted
frivolously. This simply is not the law. To avoid an award of attorney fees, the
withholding party must establish it had not acted frivolously by presenting
evidence of some reasonable justification for refusing to release non-exempt public
records. Here the only justification the District Court found was the MPD had
asserted the investigation was ongoing. The District Court ruled that circumstance,
in and of itself, rendered the MPD's conduct as non-frivolous.
The District Court abused its decision because the District Court failed to
apply the correct legal standard and failed to reach its decision through an exercise
of reason. If the withholding party withholds non-exempt public records
frivolously and unjustifiably, how does protecting the withholding party from
exposure to attorney fees with some blanket immunity promote the full and timely
disclosure of all non-exempt public records?
Moreover, there is no basis in LC. § 9-344 to support the District Court's
ruling of what amounts to absolute immunity. If that were the case, then a
withholding party could avoid liability for attorney fees simply by asserting the
investigation was ongoing, regardless of the information requested. There
certainly is no such absolute waiver or exemption language in LC. § 9-344. To the
contrary, the District Court's ruling renders LC. § 9-344 as essentially
meaningless.
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THE MPD FAILED TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE PROBABILITY
THAT HARM CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 9-335(1)(A)-(F) WOULD
RESULT FROM DISCLOSURE OF ANY RECORDS IN THE MPD FILE
The District Court never mentions the Wade decision in its Order and
certainly did not apply the clearly articulated standard in that case. " ... we hold
that the withholding agency has the burden to demonstrate a reasonable

probability that disclosure of the requested records would result in a harm
listed in Idaho Code section 9-335(l)(a)-(f)." Wade v. Taylor,_ Idaho_,
320 P.3d 1250, 1256 (2014) (Emphasis added).
During the Show Cause hearing, the MPD's two witnesses never identified a
single document that they contended the disclosure of which would have impeded
their investigation. In fact, Det. Miller confirmed that it was the MPD's policy not
to release a single document as long as the alleged investigation was pending.
Additionally, during the Show Cause hearing the Petitioners' Counsel asked
Det. Miller how releasing pictures taken of the scene could have impeded the
investigation. He responded he was never asked to produce the pictures.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Q. How would withholding pictures of the
scene impede your work?
A. Well, I was never asked to produce
pictures.
Q. Well, there are pictures in your file;
is that true?
A. It is.
Q. Okay. And I asked for documents in the
file; is that true?
I believe so.

(February 27, OSC Hearing Tr. p. 27, L. 11-20.)

Appellant's Brief - 15

As established previously, the photographs of the scene would have shown
nothing more than the MPD already had allowed Mr. Garrett to see in person. The
reality, as confirmed by Det. Miller, the MPD had an institutionalized and absolute
policy of unequivocally refusing to release information allegedly related to an
ongoing investigation.
[Cross-examination of Det. Miller]
19. Q. And I'm -- you're doing some type of an
20.investigation. And your contention today is that:
21.I'm not going to be able to give any of this
22.information to anybody because it would impede my
23.investigation? Is that your contention?
24.A. Well, I don't know how freely I can
25. talk. I kind of feel like you're trying to put
1. this on me, and it's really not my decision. I
2. mean, that's just our department policy.
(February 27, OSC Hearing Tr. p. 32, LL. 19-25 top. 33, LL. 1-2.) (Emphasis
added).
Even when the MPD's counsel asked Det. Miller to articulate how the
release of any information in his file could have impeded his investigation, he was
unable to state any reason.
[Ms. Kane - Direct examination of Detective Miller]
23. Q. Okay. And how would the disclosure of
24. the records, I guess, during the pendency of the
25. investigation interfere with law enforcement
1. proceedings?
2. A. Well, there would have been information
3. in the report that we received, callers wanting to
4. speak to us and not having had a chance to speak
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5. to them before that, I think would have
6. potentially been a problem with the investigation.
(February 27, OSC Hearing Tr. p. 23, LL. 23-25 top. 24, LL. 1-6.) (Emphasis
added)
Then on redirect, MPD' s counsel asked the same question and again Det.
Miller failed to identify a single document or any evidence the disclosure of which
would have impeded its investigation.
[Redirect-examination ofDet. Miller]
23. BY MS. KANE:
24. Q. Detective Miller, on December 21st, had
25. you made a final decision whether or not to charge
1. someone criminally?
2. A. I had not.
3. Q. And would -- I guess, would the
4. disclosure of all information and documents that
5. you had relating or pertaining to Private
6. Forbush's death, disclosure of that description of
7. the record at that point, that is on
8. December 21st, would that interfere with law
9. enforcement proceedings, in your opinion?
10. A. I believe it would, yes.
11. Q. And can you explain that opinion. How
12. did you know that it would interfere at that
13. point?
14. A. Well, I don't -- it's kind of hard to
15. draw a line, if you will, on December 21st of what
16. I had actually typed up in my report, versus what
17. I still had to type into my report. I know there
18. were people I had not yet spoken to and
19. potentially had not even written up yet. So ...
20. Q. So your investigation was still under
21. way at that point on December 21st?
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22. A. It was.
(February 27, OSC Hearing Tr. p. 34, LL. 23-25 top. 35, LL. 1- 22.)
All Det. Miller confirms is there is a MPD policy against disclosing anything
during an ongoing investigation, regardless of the law. At the show cause hearing,
the MPD failed to articulate any reasonable basis to have withheld any information
from McQuen's parents on December 21, 2012, or at any other time for that
matter. As the MPD failed to establish a single document in its file was exempt
from disclosure according to LC. § 9-335(1 )(a)-(f); it was an abuse of discretion
for the Court to have found any exemption applied.
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED
THE MPD HAD NOT ACTED FRIVOLOUSLY

Arguably the threshold analysis when determining whether a withholding
party had acted frivolously would be to consider the facts as they existed on or
before the date of the denial. Here, the Coroner had conducted his autopsy and
ruled the death an accident as of November 13, 2012. Additionally, the MPD's
expert, Jerry Peterson, had conducted his investigation but did not find that the
water heater had been altered in some manner as to intentionally cause it to
produce carbon monoxide. The reality, on December 21, 2012, the date the MPD
refused to produce a single record to McQuen' s parents; it was unlikely and
improbable that a crime had even been committed.
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1. THE MPD's DENIAL OF THE APPELLANTS' PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST WAS
FRIVOLOUS WHEN THE DENIAL WAS BASED ON THE MPD's INSTITUTIONALIZED
DISREGARD FOR THE LAW

As argued previously, the District Court ruled that even if no exemption
applied and the MPD should have disclosed the requested information and
documents, it would never be frivolous for a withholding party to refuse to disclose
public records as long as there was an ongoing investigation. Again, however, that
is not the law.
As established above through Det. Miller's testimony, the MPD was not
going to respond appropriately to a valid public records request as long as it was
continuing its investigation. Clearly such conduct violates the MPD's duty to
review its file, and to make a good faith determination as to whether or not there
existed a "reasonable probability that disclosure of the requested records would
result in a harm listed in Idaho Code section 9-335(1)(a)-(f)." There is no
evidence that the MPD conducted such a review, and in fact, Det. Miller confirms
the MPD disregards this duty under the guise of an "ongoing investigation."
The District Court abused its discretion because its ruling that a public entity
may avoid attorney fees by doing the very thing the public records statutes
prohibit; wrongfully denying a legitimate and lawful public records request, is
contrary to the public records law. If the MPD is disregarding the law and its duty
to produce non-exempt records, how does essentially violating the law constitute
justification to deny the Appellants' request for attorney fees? The District Court's
ruling effectively condones and promotes such conduct. The District Court
therefore abused its discretion when it denied the Appellants' request for attorney
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fees based on a ruling that the MPD had not acted frivolously because its
investigation ongoing.

2. THE MPD HAD ALREADY RELEASED THE REQUESTED INFORMATION
Moreover and even more compelling is the MPD's conduct in allowing Mr.
Jack Garrett access to the very information that it denied to the Petitioners. Mr.
Garrett is employed as an investigator for an insurance company representing the
management company who was managing the apartment complex. Mr. Garrett is
not a member of the MPD, nor is he associated with any State or Federal law
enforcement agency. However, in November 2012, the MPD allowed Mr. Garrett
access to the entire apartment and specifically access to the water heater so that
Mr. Garrett could obtain the make, model and serial number of the water heater.
The MPD also allowed Mr. Garrett to observe everything in the apartment that was
ultimately memorialized in the MPD photographs in its investigation file.
The MPD also allowed Mr. Garrett to participate in various tests conducted
by the MPD's expert, Jerry Peterson. Additionally, the MPD provided witness
statements to Mr. Garrett and released Jerry Peterson's report to Mr. Garrett on
December 6, 2012, the very same day the MPD received the Petitioners' Public
Record's Request. As noted above, the facts confirming the MPD's disclosure of
this information to Mr. Garrett are contained in the MPD's file, which the District
Court claims it reviewed at length prior to finding the MPD had not acted
frivolously.
If the MPD released almost all, if not all, of its investigative file to a non-law
enforcement and public third party, how is it anything but absolutely frivolous for
the MPD to contend release of the same information to McQuen's parents would
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somehow impede its investigation? The District Court abused its discretion in so
ruling. Clearly such a decision was not reached through the proper exercise of
reason.
The record on appeal established there was no justification for the MPD to
have withheld any information previously released to Mr. Garrett. Referring to the
Court's file in the Supplemental Clerk's Record, the MPD should have released the
following exhibits; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 (Jerry
Peterson's report), 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 36-47, 52, and
54-66(a) Accordingly, the District Court's ruling that the MPD's refusal to release
this information to the Parents of McQuen Forbush was not frivolous, was an
abuse of discretion and must be reversed.
THE APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Attorney fees are available to the prevailing party on appeal from the denial
of a public records request. "Thus, Idaho Code section 9-344(2) is the only statute
that applies to Wade's request for attorney fees." Wade v. Taylor,_ Idaho_,
320 P.3d 1250, 1261 (2014). In light of the ruling in Wade, the Appellants request
attorney fees according to I.C. § 9-344(2) if they are the prevailing party on appeal.
CONCLUSION

The facts establish that the MPD denied the Appellants request for
disclosure of non-exempt public records for no other reason than the MPD had an
established policy of refusing to release any records, public or not, exempt or not,
as long as the MPD claimed its investigation was continuing. Such an
institutionalized disregard for Idaho law and its duty as a public entity is the
epitome of frivolous conduct.
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Additionally, the facts establish that the MPD had released substantially, if
not all, of the information in its investigation file to a non-law enforcement third
party before the MPD denied the Appellants' request. Accordingly, claiming that
somehow the disclosure of the MPD's file would impede its investigation when the
MPD had already released the information to the public is absolutely frivolous.
The MPD' s selective and clearly arbitrary denial of the Appellants' request entitled
the Appellants to recover their costs and attorney fees.
The Appellants respectfully request that the reviewing Court reverse the
District Court and remand the case with direction to the District Court to award
costs and attorney fees to the Appellants.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of May, 2014.
:~--;;r-S, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark, For the Appellants
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Emily Kane
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